Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan Read online

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  Tariq clearly belongs to the second tradition, rather than the first. In one of his most recent books, Les musulmans d'Occident et l'avenir de l'Islam [Western Muslims and the Future of Islam], published in 2003, he openly attacks "liberal reformism' that is based on reason and that is progressive in spirit.2 It is not the first time that he has dropped his mask. The outspoken hatred of liberal Islam is already to be found in Etre musulman europeen [To Be a European Muslim], written while attending the Leicester Islamic Foundation, and published by Tawhid in 1999.3 In these two works, Ramadan makes no secret of his disdain for "liberal reformism," which, he tells us, "resulted from the influence of Western thought beginning with colonialism. ,4 In order to equate the liberals with secular atheists, he includes in the liberal camp the advocates of the secularization project of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, whom he obviously detests as much as did his grandfather. Above all, he accuses the European theoreticians of liberal reformism of being "assimilated": "In the Occident, the supporters of liberal reformism advocate the integration of Muslims, which they expect will result in the adoption of Occidental styles oflife." s He clearly has in mind the official representatives of the Muslim faith, such as the mufti of Marseille (Soheib Bencheikh) or the rector of the Paris Mosque (Dalil Boubaker).

  According to Ramadan, three facts illustrate the assimilation of the liberals. First of all, they do not "insist on the daily practice of religion' but rather on "a form of spirituality that is experienced individually and in private or else as an attachment to one's native culture. ,6 This statement reveals the extent to which Tariq Ramadan refuses to envisage any way that religion can develop into an individually held faith that is not to be forced on others, or into a culturally based faith that is to be shared as a source of enrichment instead of being instituted as an ideology. Ramadan is even more explicit on the subject of the two other characteristics that supposedly condemn liberal reformism. He reproaches the liberals for not considering the Islamic headscarf an obligation and for combating fundamentalism: "Most of them," Ramadan says of the liberals, "are opposed to any difference in people's way of dressing, which they consider synonymous with sequestration or even fundamentalism." Which makes of them traitors, corrupted by the influence of Western rationalism. "Taking the evolution of society into account, they consider that the Koran and the Surma can no longer serve as a guide for proper behavior; it is the exercise of reason that henceforth sets the criteria for social conduct." The moral of the story? "The term liberal refers here to the meaning that the term has taken on in the Occident; it privileges rationality and is founded on the primacy of the individual." Thus Tariq Ramadan, speaking as a professor of philosophy, openly accuses the Muslim liberals of promoting rationalism and individualism. In other words, if Muslims attempt to reform their religion-bringing it up to date in an intelligent manner, so as to encourage the development of an individual faith more cultural than political-instead of sticking to a dogmatic Islamist view, then they have automatically become renegades who have sold out to the West. As a way of finishing them off once and for all, Ramadan explains that, although the liberals are "a minority within the Muslim world," they have intermediaries in Europe because "their rhetoric is immediately picked up by Western ears."

  These extreme and fraudulent accusations appear not to have the slightest effect on those who insist on seeing Tariq Ramadan as the representative of an open-minded Islam. But they have been picked up by truly liberal Muslims, such as Leila Babes: "By treating this school of thought as radical secularists, and by ignoring the intellectual work being accomplished within the Muslim faith-as in the case of Ali Abd al-Raziq, Mahmoud Muhammad Taha and Muhammad Sa'id al-Ashmawi, whom he never mentions-he is suggesting that the liberal Muslims are Muslims ... without Islam. ,7 This analysis is most accurate. In a cassette, "Islam and the West," Tariq Ramadan refers openly to "Muslims that are "secular" as "Muslims without Islam."8 He effects a skilful shift of meaning, by which the Islamists-the fundamentalist Muslims-become simply Muslims, and the others, the secular or liberal Muslims, become sub-Muslims, or even non-Muslims. Whilst he is openly critical of the liberal Muslims, he never utters a word against the fundamentalists. A "fundamentalist" or "Islamist" is one who makes use of religion for freedom-destroying political ends. However, Ramadan never uses the term in speaking of Islamists. As long as they are close to the Muslim Brotherhood, the most radical of theologians and militants-from Yusuf alQaradawi to Sayyid Qutb and al-Banna-are always referred to in flattering terms, such as "political Muslims" or "scholars." This is a way of denying their fundamentalism that fools those who dorit know how to differentiate between a Muslim and an Islamist.

  Laying claim to the middle ground-an absolute priority

  It never ceases to amaze me how a preacher who is so adamantly opposed to liberal Islam can pass himself off as a modern, enlightened Muslim in the eyes of observers. By way of excusing them, it must be said that Tariq Ramadan relies on a multiplicity of rhetorical tricks to maintain this ambiguity. He constantly takes advantage of people's lack of knowledge of the Muslim world to present a vision of Islam in which he ends up by representing a sort of middle ground-even if this middle ground is a million miles from a progressive, enlightened Islam. In To Be a European Muslim (iggg) and in Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2003), Tariq Ramadan readily assumes his role as supporter of the Salafist reformism of al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Qutb, but he does so in such a way that this school of thought is not immediately recognized for what it is, namely a movement firmly opposed to liberal reform.' He takes advantage of the fact that he is one of the few Islamist intellectuals listened to and read in Europe to propose an interpretation of Islam divided into six major currents:

  • Scholarly traditionalism (linked to one of the four great schools of thought of Islam)

  • Salafist traditionalism (a "literalist" fundamentalism inspired by Arab traditions not necessarily Islamic

  • Salafist reformism (fundamentalist, but not literalist, the reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood

  • Literal political Salafism (a literalist political current, openly jihadist)

  Liberal reformism

  • Sufism (a mystic Islamic school).

  This way of breaking Salafism up into three currents out of six is pure politics. To be truly pedagogical, one should distinguish four principal schools: the scholarly tradition, the liberal reformist current, Sufism and Salafism, within which coexist three tendencies: reformist Salafism, literal Salafism and traditional Salafism. Literal Salafism is most simplistic: it consists of simply applying to the letter the Koran and the Surma. Traditional Salafism is hardly more developed, since it combines the defects of literalism and those of archaic non-Islamic traditions-such as forced marriage and female circumcision. In comparison to these two Salafisms, the third-that is to say reformist Salafism-obviously stands out as more moderate. Indeed, by advocating a reform that consists of returning to founding principles, it rids Islam of certain traditional customs without necessarily being literalist. This categorization explains how a militant Salafist reformer such as Tariq Ramadan can reject both Saudi Wahhabism and the traditionalism of the Taliban, and vehemently criticize literalism without himself being a modern, liberal Muslim. Presenting Islam as formed of six different schools reduces liberal Islam to the smallest possible share (one sixth) on the fringe, and situates Salafist reformism in the middle ground, equidistant from both the "excesses" of rational reformism, considered as too Western, and of literalism or traditionalism, seen as too archaic.

  While accepting his role as heir to Salafist reformism, Ramadan bristles with anger when he is suspected of being influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy: "My way of thinking draws on interaction and dialogue with all tendencies, and I do my best to propose a theoretical development that takes account of this diversity by combining reformists (including the Muslim Brotherhood among other groups), the Sufis, the rationalists and embracing even Salafist traditionalism and the
Tabligh."10 One understands why Ramadan chooses to bury the reference to the Muslim Brotherhood in the avalanche. But the statement is troubling. Note that it does not specify the proportions of the mix. In reality, Tariq Ramadan draws principally on the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, but sprinkles his theory with a minimum number of references to the other sources-all of them, with the exception of Muslim rationalism, apparently far too radical for him. When he quotes "rationalism," Ramadan is speaking not of Muslim rationalismwhich he loathes-but of non-Muslim rationalism, which he cites here and there to avoid being suspected of Islamism, and only then when the reasoning in question is in line with his own thinking. He does not repudiate Sufism, which also influenced his grandfather, so long as it is orthodox Sufism and not a Sufism that would allow for innovation regarding the basic principles of Islam. As for the other two references, the Tabligh and Salafist traditionalism, there's nothing to be proud of. The Tabligh-often called the Jehovah s Witnesses of Islam-is an Islamist pietist movement, obsessed by the dawa (in other words by proselytizing), that is responsible for the many conversions to Islam that have taken place in France over the last few years. It is understandable that Ramadan, whose mission is dawa for Europe, should take the Tabligh as a model, butwhy cite them? As for Salafist traditionalism, this is the most reactionary and fundamentalist ideology of Islam, and Ramadan claims to be combating it in order to appear more moderate. To this extent Ramadan is right: his way ofthinking is, in effect, based on this patchwork. But once we take account ofthe relative weight attached to each ofthe schools, and once we correctly identify them, we realize that these multiple influences have nothing very reassuring about them. But never mind. The preacher has developed thousands ofways ofthrowing any accusers offthe trail.

  To convince his audience, he likes to say that he is detested by the extremists: "In the eyes of the fundamentalists, I am a traitor!" Without ever specifying who these "fundamentalists" might be. Yet, for him, the term can only refer to the literalist jihadist Salafists, in other words to Al-Qaeda, Al-Muha- jiroun or Hizb ut-Tahrir; that is to say, to those in favor of immediately waging holy war to establish a worldwide Islamic dictatorship. From this perspective, he is indeed more moderate. But does this mean he stands for the modernization of Islam? Many people think so, forgetting that his "middle ground" has often helped turn events in favor of the Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the detriment of progressive Muslims.

  Reformist Salafism as a bulwark against ... Salafism!

  Tariq Ramadan has scoured his imagination to find ways of protecting his Salafist reformism from accusations of extremism, in particular by tailoring his rhetoric to fit the audience in question. When speaking to a "friendly" audience, he is forthright in declaring the school of thought to which he belongs, but he takes pains to avoid being too explicit about it when speaking to a public that might disapprove. Interviewed by the community radio station Beur FM in November 2003, he admitted adhering to Salafist reformism: "There is the rationalist reformism and the Salafist school, in the sense that the Salafist tries to remain faithful to basic principles. I belong to the latter; that is to say, there's a certain number of principles that are, for me, fundamental and that, as a Muslim, I refuse to betray."" It is impossible to be more explicit. Ramadan is indeed a reformist, but a Salafist reformist, in the fundamentalist tradition (the word salaf in Arabic means "our pious ancestors"). The term "reform' indicates his willingness to renew our understanding of Islam, but the adjective "Salafist" reveals in which direction this reinterpretation is to take us-namely backwards. Tariq Ramadan is prepared to adopt this stance-except when speaking to the general public, when he plays on words. On February 25, 2004, less than four months after his interview on Beur FM, he spoke quite a different language in a symposium organized by UNESCO. Painted into a corner by Ghaleb Bencheikh, known as a representative of the liberal reformist school, Ramadan turned the audience in his favor by claiming his opponent had falsely accused him: "I am not a Salafist! `Salafi' means literalist. I am not a literalist." 12 The denial worked so well that members of the audience took the floor to say how reassuring they found it ...

  In truth, this was a brilliant stroke of trickery. Here we have Tariq Ramadan caught red-handed indulging in doublespeak. Salaf refers to the basic principles of Islam, not to literalism. And Ramadan is indeed a Salafist, even if he is not a literalist. He does advise Muslims to be faithful to the spirit of the text rather than to the precise wording-"what is absolute is not the letter, but the spirit" 13-but nonetheless considers the precepts formulated in the seventh century, in a specific historical context, to be "in essence eternal truths." Which means that his non-literalist Salafism is a way of refusing to modernize or rethink principles that date from the seventh century.

  "No" to patriarchal traditions ... unless they are Islamic

  The Muslim Brotherhood understood early on that they could pass their fundamentalism off as a form of progress if they were to emphasize the fact that their puritanism has rid Islam of some patriarchal traditions-traditions that were not Islamic. Journalists who are not familiar with Islam are often surprised to hear Tariq Ramadan condemn archaic, sexist practices, such as female circumcision and forced marriage. If they have heard experts in the field refer to him as a dangerous fundamentalist, they then assume they have been lied to and that Ramadan is, in fact, a progressive Muslim. But there is nothing progressive about his enterprise, even if he contests certain injustices inflicted on women. Tariq Ramadan is devoted to Salafist reformism. It is just that the basic principles of Islam are less misogynous than one tends to think. Even if the Koran dates from the seventh century and is taken literally, it is less sexist than the majority of twenty-first century Islamist groups.

  Coming seven centuries after Jesus and twenty centuries after Moses, the Koran is the first monotheist text that does not view male domination as justified by original sin. An entire sura is devoted to women, basically in order to grant them rights they did not up to then enjoy. The Koran grants women the right to inherit half of what a man inherits-which marks considerable progress at a time when women had no financial autonomy. The Koran also forbids men from disinheriting the wives they repudiate: "But if you intend to take one wife in place of another, even if you had given the latter a whole treasure for a dowry, take not the least bit of it back; would you take it by slan der and a manifest wrong? "14 What is not generally known is that most of the sexist practices ascribed to Islam are actually patriarchal traditions that many Muslims refuse to reconsider, despite the more advanced views contained in the Koran and the Sunna. Forced marriages, for instance, are in total contradiction to the teachings of the Prophet-who authorized a woman to refuse to marry a man her father had chosen for her. The four schools of jurisprudence of Sunni Islam agree on this, basing their opinion on the following hadith: "The widow has more rights over her marriage than her tutor, and virgins cannot be married without their consent." The same intransigence exists regarding female circumcision-in reality practiced out of respect for patriarchal traditions, but said to be of religious origin. During his lifetime, the Prophet attempted to calm the zeal of his fellow citizens. In particular, he advised a woman whose vocation it was to practice circumcision not to cut too deep into the clitoris since "it is better for the woman and affords the husband greater pleasure." There was hardly anyone to listen to him ... Despite the injunctions of the Koran-and even if it is against the law in many Muslim countries-female circumcision continues to be practiced on some one million young girls in Egypt every year, as well as on millions of others in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan.,5

  As a fundamentalist Muslim who claims to be modern, Ramadan is opposed to these non-Islamic practices, but has never written a book devoted to them. He is content to remind his public, in the course of a conference or an interview, of the extent to which these practices sully Islarri s image and of the fact that they are not to be attributed to religion. Very often, he does so to defend Islam a
gainst any form of criticism. In 1998, when giving a lengthy conference on "The Muslim woman' in Senegal, a country in which female circumcision is widely practiced, he disposed ofthe problem in one sentence: "Female circumcision is not Islamic."16 Full stop. Nor, as far as I am aware, has he ever given a lecture on the subject in Sudan, where he has contacts at the highest levels. Ramadan could take advantage of his status, of the prestige he enjoys in the eyes of Islamists worldwide, to devote all his energy to a real modernization of Islam. He can sometimes be critical of the Muslim community and of Muslim traditions, but at heart he remains deeply con servative. The liberal reformers wear themselves out waging this battle; they dare to call for a real reform of the sexist practices stemming from tradition or the Koran. But the Salafist reformers devote far less time to the subject. This difference in the way the two schools invest their energy is no accident. The modern-minded reformists consider it a priority to put an end to the injustices committed in the name of their religion, whether sanctioned by the Koran or not. The Salafist reformers, on the other hand, make strategic use of the fight against non-Islamic customs to demonstrate that a return to basic principles can mean progress, and to protect Islam from the criticism of Westerners. Appearing as champions of anti-traditional reform is one of their tactics for avoiding criticism, without, in fact, contributing to the evolution of Islam. Even if the status ofwomen could thereby be slightly improved (circumcisions that cut less deep, fewer forced marriages), one must remember that these concessions are granted in the context of a broad-based return to an archaic way of life, modeled on standards of morality established in the seventh century, without any modernization of their basic principles.