Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan Page 14

  Al-Qaeda is only a brief episode and an expedient instrument in the century-old existence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The true danger is in the expansion of the Brotherhood, an increase in its audience. The wolf knows how to disguise itself as a sheep. Tariq Ramadan, for instance, is not part ofAl-Qaeda but of the Brotherhood. If one were to clearly denounce the power and the strategy of the Brotherhood, those who spread its influence and recruit in its name would be forced to give an account of themselves rather than showing off on TV or in international forums.'°9

  Concerning Ramadan's double talk, the 2001 report of the Belgian Permanent Committee for the Control of Intelligence Services is no less severe: "State security also reported that the moderate speeches that Tariq Ramadan gives in public do not always correspond to the remarks made in confidential Islamic settings, where he is far more critical of Western society." A number of individual cases can serve as confirmation.

  Djamel Beghal, a Lyon Islamist arrested for terrorist activities, declared to Judge Jean-Louis Brugiere: "In 1994 I took courses given by Tariq Ramadan, who is an Egyptian with Swiss nationality belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood." Tariq Ramadan dismissed this sworn statement with a wave of his hand: "It's impossible. I only began those courses in 1997!""' The explanation is a bit too succinct. In reality he had given lectures-considered by the associations that invited him to be training seminars-since 1994. They took on a more official character in 1997, but they existed well before. It is, therefore, possible and even probable that Djamel Beghal did attend, as he affirms, Ramadan's lecture-conferences. Moreover why would he lie? It does not mean that Tariq Ramadan himself urged Djamel Beghal to become a terrorist. One can simply register the fact that his influence does not have the moderating effect that he makes so much of when with journalists.

  A danger for the United States; a "wise man" for Great Britain

  In the autumn of 2004 Tariq Ramadan was scheduled to be "in charge of the study program devoted to religions, conflicts and the establishment of peace" for the Joan B. Kroc Institute that is part of Notre Dame University. A magnificent university, founded in 1842 by a priest of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, equipped with a basilica, numerous chapels, two liturgical choirs, departments of theological studies, and a program of Catholic education by satellite. The man who recruited him, Scott Appleby, has written for several books on religious fundamentalism, such as The Fundamentalist Project," and was perfectly well informed ofthe polemics set off in France by the preacher. "It's precisely because he was at the heart of these polemics in Europe that we wanted him here," he declared to the magazine Lyon Mag.112 Officially, his decision to bring Tariq Ramadan to the United States was in keeping with the Kroc Center's policy. In the beginning, the idea was to foster dialogue between Americans and communists, but since the fall of the Berlin Wall the Center has focused rather on Muslims, with the objective of finding "non-violent solutions to conflict." How did a specialist in fundamentalism come to think of Tariq Ramadan for such an assignment? Appleby claims to have listened to Tariq Ramadari s tape recordings. He admits that Ramadan is a skilled speaker, but refuses to consider him an Islamist: "He knows perfectly well that if it was proven that he was an Islamist he would no longer be welcome."113 This is false; the proof is there. And yet the director of the institute defended him: "Tariq Ramadan is neither an extremist nor anti-Semitic." As regards the struggle against secularism in the West, Tariq Ramadan is on the right side in the American's eyes. Although he is antifun- damentalist, Appleby supports the Islamo-Christian alliance against secularism. In an article published in Foreign Policy, he suggests that the next pope forge a sort of alliance with Islam. Compared to what he describes as a "new and aggressive secularization," he presents Islam as "the great world religion that is both the Church s main rival for adherents and its potential ally against a purely materialistic concept of human development. "114 From this perspective, Tariq Ramadan most certainly has a lot to teach American Catholics. But from a security perspective, on the other hand, the United States had no need whatever of someone like Tariq Ramadan. On July 28, 2004, the Department for Homeland Security decided to revoke his visa-a blow for the preacher, whose image in Europe suffered, except in England, where Tariq Ramadan surprisingly bounced back, thanks to relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and some members of the Labor Party. The Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, is very close to the Muslim Brotherhood's most listened-to theologian, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. On July 12, 2004, the two men fell into each other's arms at a meeting of the pro-hijab association (an organization "to put pressure on European parliaments" to accept the Islamic headscarf). The meeting was set up by the English branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, thanks to the patronage of the mayor-and was attended by Tariq Ramadan. The Swiss preacher has been much in demand in England ever since the government decided to counter the influence of the Salafist jihadists by promoting leaders representing a fundamentalist Islam, officially non-terrorist, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Only a few days after the attacks of July 7 and July 21, 2005, Tariq Ramadan was invited by the London police to give a lecture on Islam. In autumn of 2005-stupefaction: he was being considered for membership on the government's working group for "Preventing Extremism Together" - set up to advise Tony Blair on how to "combat Islamic extremism." It was taken as a joke. But the Prime Minister stood fast and defended his choice. And the left-wing press backed him up, all the more so since the foremost attacks on Tariq Ramadan came from the Sun and were thus considered "Islamophobic." Yet Ramadan's presence on this working group is alarming. The group's first proposal was to abolish commemoration ofthe Holocaust Memorial Day, on the basis that it was "wounding" to Muslims. Iqbal Sacranie, a Muslim Brotherhood member ofthe Muslim Council of Britain, who was knighted by the Queen in 2005 for "services to the Muslim community," explained that he had always boycotted Holocaust Memorial Day because it was "offensive to Muslims." For Tony Blair's working group, this day of commemoration did not do sufficient justice to the atrocities suffered by Muslims, and thus gave the impression that "Western lives were of greater value than non-Western lives." The committee proposed replacing it with a national Genocide Day that would marl, the genocide of the Palestinians, the Bosnians, and the Chechens. Another member of the group, Ahmad Thomson of the Association of Muslim Lawyers, took advantage of his appointment to furnish the press with his version of the war in Iraq: "Tony Blair decided to wage war on Iraq after coming under the influence of a `sinister' group of Jews and Freemasons."115 In 1994, he wrote a book claiming that the European and American governments were controlled by Jews and Freemasons, that the Holocaust was "a big lie," and that the Jews were not a pure race.

  How can one explain Tony Blair's decision to set up an advisory committee on "Islamic extremism," in whichthe Muslim Brotherhood and their propaganda are given a starring role? The decision would appear to confirm that, within the British government, there are some who are toying with the idea of making a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood: a stop to terrorism in exchange for concessions that reinforce their position in the community. This hypothesis is by no means far-fetched. After having served for years as a haven for the most virulent jihadists, Britain has been obliged, since 9/ii-and even more so since 7/7-to re-examine its legendary tolerance of Islamists, without, however, subjecting its communitarian (and vote-catching) approach to similar scrutiny. Over the last few months, mosques that were under Salafist influence have been taken over by the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical movement but one that is prepared to give voting instructions and that is considered more "controllable" by the British authorities-but wrongly so. As in the case of Nicolas Sarkozy in France, who also chose to institutionalize the Muslim Brotherhood, backing a fundamentalist movement in order to combat terrorism could well prove not only counterproductive, but dangerous. The Salafist jihadists are far too radical to be restrained by the political Muslim Brotherhood, whom they despise for their "softness" and consider to be "innovative." The Salafists can only be rendered ha
rmless through thorough intelligence work, and by politicians who do not feed the fires of religious identity, which is exactly what the government is doing by choosing to entrust the future of the Muslim community to the Muslim Brotherhood-an organization that has always known how to take advantage of a state's failures in order to pursue its goal of conquest. As we shall see, Tariq Ramadan is counting on the Islamization of the European Muslim communities to fulfil the dreams of his father and grandfather. Yet he still needs to ponder the advice of Hassan al-Banna, who recommended advancing stealthily, step by step. The loss of his post at Notre Dame University and the ban on his working in the United States were obstacles in Ramadan's path. By accepting the position of "visiting research fellow" (that is to say, without pay) at the prestigious St. Antony's College, Oxford, and thanks to his being officially appointed by the British government to a working group on "Preventing Extremism Together." Tariq Ramadan can hope to re-establish his legitimacy. And, after all, he might well hope that the United States will lift its ban on his working there ... That is, unless decisionmakers, the press, and all those who believe in Tariq Ramadan's good faith finally take the time not just to read him and listen to him, but also to decode his message.

  PART TWO

  DISCOURSE AND RHETORIC

  In principle, it is not that difficult to see that Tariq Ramadan speaks with two voices: you have to read him and listen to him, and then you have to decipher what he is saying. The trouble is that few newspaper reporters have the time or the space required both to recount his career and to analyze his message. Journalists are, by their nature, drawn to the telling of events, and they prefer to adduce biographical facts rather than dissect rhetoric, which means that Tariq Ramadan can often claim that he is attacked on account of his family background or the people he is in contact with, rather than for what he says. A few magazines have made the effort-Islam de France and Nunc spring to mind. But their circulation is such that they are no match for the media attention that Tariq Ramadan commands.' Until now, therefore, he has managed by challenging his interlocutors to cite a single sentence of his that is in any way compromising. It is no simple matter; as a preacher he has worked hard, almost obsessively, at redefining his terminology, so that a very ordinary sentence can have different meanings according to the context in which it is spoken. Complex and far-fetched though this may seem, and contrary to what I thought when I wrote Tirs Croisse [Crossfire], this doublespeak does indeed exist. To dig it out, dissect it and demonstrate how it operates is not something that can be done in a sentence or two. It is like the works of a Swiss watch (no play on words intended!) that you have to dismantle wheel by wheel. All of this takes time. This part of the book is, therefore, entirely devoted to analyzing the content of Tariq Ramadari s public speeches, newspaper articles, books, and recorded tapes, so as to put them in perspective and measure their impact.

  Chapter3

  A "Reformist" but a Fundamentalist

  Triq Ramadan claims to be a "reformer." The term touches on two commonly held notions-that of political reform pursued in a spirit of moderate renewal, and the Protestant reformation. But these images are confusing to those who have heard him spoken of as an Islamist. Tariq Ramadan is aware of the fact and never misses an opportunity to insist on the term "reformer" being used. Here is the definition that he gives of the word "reformer" in the glossary published as an annex to the French edition of Etre musulman europeen [To be a European Muslim]: `According to traditional prophecy, a reformer will appear in each century to renew the Muslims' understanding oftheir religion. It is this renewal-not a renewal ofthe texts themselves but a renewal of their interpretation-that will give further impetus to Islamic teachings and allow for their adaptation to the context ofthe time."' Recalling this prophetic tradition is by no means irrelevant. Obviously, one is expected to think ofhim in this connection. This messianism with a reformist touch works wonders with American journalists. In zooo, Time magazine chose to name him as one who would bring about a renewal of his religion, as an "innovator." Others have gone so far as to speak of Tariq Ramadan as "Islarns Martin Luther King." Such prophecies may not go down so well in France, where skepticism in regard to religion is widely accepted. But in France, Tariq Ramadan often compares his reformism to liberation theology, which clears him of any suspicion of bigotry, even in the eyes of radical left militants who are, for the most part, anti-clerical. He is seen as a thinker who will reform Islam, make it more rational, modern and even more secular. This is an objective to which Tariq Ramadan has never laid claim, but which he takes care not to repudi ate-just as he is careful not to inform the journalists who have not read his books of the real history of the term "reform' in Islam. Let us fill in the background for him.

  The ambiguities of the term "reform"

  In Islam there exist two quite different reformist trends. The first is a liberal reformism that is intent on making Islam more progressive and openminded, more rational and modern-an Islam that is cultural rather than political. The second is Salafist reformism that is turned towards the past, towards an Islam based on founding principles, more archaic and more political. To understand what is at stake, one has to grasp the basic features of liberal reformism-contested by the Salafists:

  i Islam is not a political system. Along the lines of the analysis developed by Abd alRaziq in Islam et lesfondements du pouvoir [Islam and the Origins of Powerj, liberal reformism points to the fact that Mohammed never set up a government during his lifetime and made no provisions for designating a successor or instituting a political system that would survive him. We are also reminded that the great majority of the verses of the Koran (more than 70 percent) deal with questions that are strictly religious and not social. Regulations such as those concerning the wearing of the veil are altogether trivial matters by comparison with the overriding importance that the Koran accords to the five pillars of religion: the profession of faith, prayer, pilgrimage, the observance of Ramadan, and the obligation to give alms (zakat).

  2 Islam is compatible with secularism and democracy. The Koran, in a sura entitled "Consultation" (choura), explicitly proposes that "men consult between themselves on their affairs." Which indicates-even more conclusively than the Biblical phrase "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's"-the extent to which Islam is open to the idea of a democratic dialogue separate from the realm of the sacred.

  3 Islam calls for recourse to reason and thus for adapting to changing times. Islamic jurisprudence (filth) provides for account to be taken of commonly held opinions (ijma) to allow for evolution and adaptation to the times. Liberal Muslims encourage efforts at interpretation and personal reasoning (~tihad).

  4 Islam is not intent on proselytizing. Liberal reformism considers that religious faith is not something to be forced on others, in accordance with the verse of the Koran that explicitly bans proselytizing: "If your Lord had so willed, the whole of the universe would have espoused the faith. Is it then for you to force men to believe?"

  On all these points, the Salafist reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood is totally opposed to the liberals. They sometimes cite the same references and the same verses, but ascribe to them a totally different meaning. For them, religion and politics are inseparable, practically indistinguishable, to the extent that they often attach more importance to campaigning on social issues, such as the Islamic headscarf, than to questions of ritual or theology. According to the Muslim Brotherhood-which is the principal school of Salafist reformism-the call for "consultation' is not to be taken as acceptance of the principles of secularism or democracy, but as a call for pluralism in terms of religious obedience. They use it as a pretext in pleading for political representation when confronted by one-party systems that block their access to power in certain Arab/Muslim countries, but they dream at the same time of reducing this pluralism, once in command, to a dialogue between Islamist scholars. When that day comes, the law will be based on the sharia and there will no longer be any question of taking "co
mmonly held opinions" into account, but only of being as faithful as possible to the Koran and the Surma (made up of the hadiths or words spoken by the Prophet and taken down by his companions). The Salafist reformers often express a certain disdain for Islamic jurisprudence, which has enabled Islam to evolve over the last fourteen centuries, since they want to return to a pure, original Islam. To have their way, they are prepared to use any means-though they often repeat the passage from the Koran that condemns proselytizing, in order to prove that Islam is tolerant, they never actually take it into account. On the contrary, they are obsessed with the idea ofthe dawa, that is to say the transmission of the faith, and conversion.

  Far from being complementary, the progressive and Salafist reformers have been at war for almost a century-perhaps even from the very beginnings of Islam. The vicissitudes of history, the Crusades, and the colonial context have, until today, benefited the latter to the detriment of the former, preventing Islam from pursuing its aggiornamento. So, even today, Salafist reformers have an easy time discrediting reason and modernity as Western and thus enemy qualities; only a return to the foundations of Islam will restore the vigour and cohesion of the early days-that is to say, revive the Golden Age of the caliphate and Muslim expansion. Liberal reform symbolizes for them subjection to the Western colonizer, whereas the Salafist reform will re-establish a Muslim world that is strong and triumphant-in short, a colonizing power.